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BOOTH V. MARYLAND: WHETHER VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES
LESTER K. SYREN*
INTRODUCTION
The Bronsteins' son arrived at his parents' house to drive
himself and his father to pick up their tuxedos for an upcoming
wedding. The son found his father and mother in their living
room; each had been bound, gagged, and stabbed twelve times
in the chest. The impact upon the son was devastating and
spread quickly to the other members of the family.' It is the
impact upon the family and its place in the sentencing of a con-
victed murderer that is the subject of this student comment.
After Maryland police apprehended the Bronsteins' mur-
derers and brought them to trial, the jury convicted them of
murder as principals in the first degree, punishable by life
imprisonment or death. At the time, Maryland law required
the jury to consider a victim impact statement (VIS) during the
trial's sentencing phase.2 The Maryland Division of Parole and
Probation prepared the Bronsteins' VIS based on interviews
with their family members.
The jury chose the death sentence. John Booth, the
defendant, appealed the decision, eventually to the United
States Supreme Court. In Booth v. Maryland,' the Court vacated
the death sentence, reasoning that the evidence in the VIS was
irrelevant and inflammatory and thus created the risk that the
death penalty would be administered in an arbitrary and capri-
cious fashion. To do so violated the eighth amendment's bar
against cruel and unusual punishment.4
* B.A. 1985, Thomas Aquinas College; J.D. 1989, University of Notre
Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89. To my father and mother.
1. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2537 (1987).
2. "In any case in which the death penalty is requested . . . a
presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement, shall be
completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and it shall be considered
by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is
conducted ...... MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986).
3. 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987).
4. Id. at 2532.
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Booth is wrongly decided. The majority opinion excludes
VIS from any capital sentencing process.5 The dissenting opin-
ions would have left the Maryland statute intact.6 It is argued
here that neither position withstands legal and normative scru-
tiny. From a legal and moral standpoint, the jury should con-
sider VISs, but only when the murderer knew of his victim's
connection with others in the community or when that informa-
tion was criminally foreseeable. Before presenting this posi-
tion in greater detail, this comment will first review the history
and rationale of VISs in general and Maryland's VISs in
particular.
I. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS IN GENERAL:
DEFINITION AND RATIONALE
Before June 1987, when the Supreme Court decided Booth,
thirty-six states had statutes that called for sentencers to con-
sider VISs.7 Likewise, the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, intended as a model for the states,' included a VIS in
presentence reports.9 The statutes varied as to content and
application, however.'
In general, a VIS describes the harm suffered by the victim
and is usually included in a presentence report. In some states,
victim includes the victim's family." Early VISs contained a
description of physical and psychological injuries, economic
losses, and changes in the victim's family relationships that
resulted from the offense.'" Some of the later statutes
restricted the content of a VIS to the personal and economic
loss of the victim and defined victim narrowly to exclude a vic-
tim's family members.'" The VIS envisioned by the Federal
5. "We conclude that the introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment, and therefore the
Maryland Statute is invalid to the extent it requires consideration of this
information." Id. at 2536.
6. Id. at 2539, 2541.
7. McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 507
n.22 (1986).
8. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291,
§ 2(b)(3), 96 Stat. 1248, 1249 (1982).
9. Id.
10. McLeod, supra note 7, at 508.
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 1 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 213.005 (1986).
12. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2515, 2518 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 532].
13. McLeod, supra note 7, at 511, quoting a Connecticut statute that
limits the contents "solely to the facts of the case and the extent of any
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Rules of Criminal Procedure includes financial, social, psycho-
logical, and physical harm to any victim of the offense.' 4 Con-
gress purposely adopted a broad definition of victim to include
indirect victims, for instance, the family members of murder
victims. 15
Maryland erred on the side of a broader range of informa-
tion. The statute permitted reports concerning physical and
economic loss to the victim. It also allowed any request for
psychological services by the victim or his family members and,
at the court's discretion, any other information related to the
impact of the offense on the victim or his family. 6 The Mary-
land Court of Appeals ruled that in capital cases "the victims
include survivors of the murdered individual."' 7
A. Justification for Using VISs
Proponents justified VISs on two grounds: victim partici-
pation and sentence proportionality. In this regard, the legisla-
tive history accompanying the Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982 (which amended the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to include a VIS in presentence reports) pointed out
that the criminal process had neglected victims' concerns. 18
Although defendants had lawyers who could explain the crimi-
nal process, victims had "no assistance and few rights."' 19 The
victim rarely knew what finally happened to the defendant or
what possible causes of action or compensation were avail-
injuries, financial losses and loss of earnings directly resulting from the crime
for which the defendant is being sentenced." Id.
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(c).
15. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 12, at 2519.
16. The VIS is to
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court
requires.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986).
17. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 223, 507 A.2d 1098, 1124 (1986).
18. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 12, at 2516.
19. Id.
1989]
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able.2" Congress felt that because of this neglect victims were
hesitant to participate in criminal proceedings; yet their coop-
eration was essential. Congress hoped that VISs would facili-
tate the victim's input.2 " Studies buttressed this Congressional
belief that victims might more readily cooperate in the criminal
process if given some way to contribute. 22
In addition to recognizing the victim, participation may
help the victim,"regain a sense of control over his life and fulfill
a desire for retributive justice. "23 In essence, a VIS provides a
catharsis for the victim. One victim who testified before Con-
gress complained that she did not have the chance to tell any-
one about what happened to her.24 VISs, it was thought, would
remedy this problem by giving the victim his say in court. 25
Besides victim participation, proponents claim VISs would
help the sentencer construct a more proportionate sentence. 26
The first' federal courts relied on VISs to provide judges with
information "that might not otherwise be brought to his atten-
tion."'27 In Lodowski v. State,28 in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that VISs were constitutional, the court voiced
similar concerns: "[t]here is 'a paucity of restraints being
placed on a judge possessing the responsibility to impose pun-
ishment, lest he be "forced to bridle himself with mental blind-
20. Id. at 2516, 2518.
21. Id.
22. "Victim witness agencies.., have continued to be concerned about
the lack of witness cooperation. In evaluating this 'persistent phenomenon,'
Davis (1983) suggested that victims might be more cooperative if they were
given a chance to have their opinions heard in court." Villmoare & Neto,
Victim Appearances at Sentencing Under California's Victims' Bill of Rights, August
1987, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, 5.
Another advantage of the VIS is that it recognizes the "forgotten"
victim. In the report just mentioned, California judges commented that a
victim's appearance at the trial under California's Bill of Rights (which
included the victim's statement of the impact of the crime) "has been a real
significant step toward victim recognition and awareness. It is as important
as a public statement as it is as a court tool." Id. at 4.
23. McLeod, supra note 7, at 504.
24. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 12, at 2518.
25. The same judges in the report supra at note 22 observed that VISs
allow victims to "get it off their chest" and hence feel as if the system is
listening.
26. "This is the position advanced by the President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime: 'Two lives-the defendant's and the victim's-are
profoundly affected by a criminal sentence. The court cannot make an
informed decision on a just punishment if it hears from only one side.'"
McLeod, supra note 7, at 506.
27. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 12, at 2517-18.
28. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985).
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ers and thus enter the process of imposing sentence with
impaired vision." ' "29 In short, the punishment should fit the
crime-and the crime includes harm to the victim and the vic-
tim's family.30
B. Maryland's VIS
Even before the Maryland legislature codified the use of
VISs, Maryland courts were considering such information."
The Maryland legislature amended its code in 1982 to set mini-
mum standards for the contents of VISs and to provide the use
of VISs in as many cases as were fiscally possible.3 2
The purposes behind the legislation were no different than
the purposes listed earlier in this note. The bill's sponsor
wanted to increase the victim's participation in the criminal
process and provide the sentencer with informa tion that would
help him construct a more proportionate sentence."
29. Id. at 744, 490 A.2d at 1255 (citation omitted).
30. Punishment may also include compensation to the victim, either from
the defendant or state victim assistance programs. Here again the impact on
the victim is relevant. The victim mentioned above who complained to
Congress that she did not have a chance to tell her story, also complained
that her medical bills as a result of the crime were over $11,000. She received
only $350. She called the probation officer who told her he was unaware of
her injuries because they were not mentioned in her file. S. REP. No. 532,
supra note 12, at 2519.
Congress used this example to manifest the need for the victim's input to
adequately compensate the victim for his loss. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically called for any information that "may aid the court in
sentencing, including the restitution needs of any victim of the offense." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D). Congress reasoned that the VIS could also alert
state officers and agencies to other needs of the victim in addition to
compensation, for instance, problems with the victim's employer over loss of
time at work, or with creditors of the victim. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 12,
at 2519.
31. "[B]efore the legislative enactments concerning victim impact
statements, it was not uncommon for the State's Attorney in at least five of
the larger jurisdictions in this State to submit such statements for the court's
consideration in imposing sentence." Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 741,
490 A.2d 1228, 1253 (1985).
32. Id. at 745, 490 A,2d at 1256.
33. [I] object to the type of one-sided compassion, practiced in many
courtrooms. I refer to the tendency to concentrate on seeking out
mitigating circumstances and rehabilitative potential as a rationale
for meting out less than harsh sentences to offenders. Surely, there
should be some place in the sentencing procedure to view the victim
with compassion and assess the harm done. And just as surely, the
extent of that harm should be a major factor to be considered when
sentencing is determined.
Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 816, 490 A.2d 1289, 1292 (1985) (quoting the
1989]
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The legislature was not the only one who wanted VISs.
The Maryland Division of Parole and Probation thought the
VISs would be helpful at parole hearings and supervisions and
as a measure of compensation due the victim. 34
The Maryland legislature specifically requited the use of
VISs in capital sentencing cases. 35 The constitutionality of this
provision was challenged in Lodowski v. State.36 In Lodowski, the
jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and it
sentenced him to death after considering a presentence report
that included a VIS. Lodowski argued that the evidence in the
VIS was irrelevant to his guilt and was, therefore, an "arbitrary
factor ' 37 in the sentencing decision.3 8
The Maryland court's response to this argument was one
of deference to the Maryland legislature:
We see no constitutional impediment to the legislature's
determination that victim impact statements are relevant
in-a capital sentencing proceeding, and we bow to the
legislative judgment that such statements are relevant.
Since they are relevant they do not constitute an arbitrary
factor. 39
Lodowski's second argument arose from a Maryland Court
of Appeals decision which "emphasized that the sentence
should be fashioned . . . to the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the crime and the individual then being sen-
tenced."40 That earlier decision did not rely on any precedent
for its claim, but felt it was "elementary." '4 ' The court noted
that punishment should be proportionate to the offense and
that the circumstances reveal the magnitude of the offense in a
particular case. The court also stated that each defendant is
unique and should be treated as an individual. Considering the
circumstances of the crime furthers that end by enabling the
statement of Senator Garrity in a hearing before the Maryland SenateJudicial
Proceedings Committee on January 19, 1982).
Thus, Maryland's statute required its courts to consider the VIS "in
determining the appropriate sentence, and in entering any order of restitu-
tion to the victim." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(iii) (1986).
34. Reid, 302 Md. at 817, 490 A.2d at 1292.
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 124(d) (1986).
36. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985).
37. Id. at 738, 490 A.2d at 1252.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 740, 490 A.2d at 1253.
40. Id.
41. Henry v. State, 273 Md. 131, 150, 328 A.2d 293, 304 (1974).
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sentencer to make his punishment fact specific, that is, particu-
lar to the individual before the court.4 2
Lodowski claimed that the evidence fell outside the facts
and circumstances of the crime and thus was irrelevant to the
sentencer's decision.4 3
The Maryland court found that Lodowski's construction of
"facts and circumstances ' 44 was too narrow. The court stated,
"We believe that there is a reasonable nexus between the
impact of the offense upon the victim's family and the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crime especially as to the grav-
ity or aggravating quality of the offense."45 To further buttress
its position, the court cited an Alaska Supreme Court case,
which held that "information regarding ... victims is encom-
passed within the objective of providing the sentencing court
with a 'complete description of the offense and the circum-
stances surrounding it' in the presentence report."46
Judge Cole dissented from the majority's reasoning and
predicted that Maryland's VISs in capital sentencing proce-
dures was "on a direct collision course with the constitutional
ban against cruel and unusual punishment."4 7 Of course,
Maryland's statute finally did collide with the Supreme Court in
Booth v. Maryland.48
C. Booth v. Maryland
On the evening of May 18, 1983, John Booth and an
accomplice bound and gagged Irvin (seventy-eight years old)
and his wife Rose (seventy-five years old) Bronstein in their liv-
ing room and then stabbed each in the chest twelve times. The
murderers' purpose was to steal money in order to buy heroin.
Booth later explained to his girlfriend that he and his friend
had killed the Bronsteins because they knew him.49
As mentioned earlier, the Maryland jury convicted Booth
of murder and sentenced him to death. In the process, the jury
considered a VIS that the Division of Parole and Probation pre-
pared from interviews with the Bronsteins' son, daughter, son-
42. Id. at 149-50, 328 A.2d at 304.
43. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 741, 490 A.2d 1228, 1253 (1985).
44. Id. at 741, 490 A.2d at 1253-54.
45. Id. at 741-42, 490 A.2d at 1254.
46. Id. at 742, 490 A.2d at 1254 (quoting Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20
(Alaska 1977)).
47. Lodowski, 302 Md. at 755, 490 A.2d at 1261.
48. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
49. Booth v. State, 302 Md. 172, 185, 507 A.2d 1098, 1104 (1986).
1989]
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in-law, and granddaughter.5" The statute required the VIS to
include a description of any changes in the victim's family rela-
tionships or any family requests for psychological services
stemming from the offense.5' In addition, the statement was to
include any other information 'related to the impact of the
offense on the victim's family that the court felt necessary.52
The Bronsteins' son reported his parents' happy marriage
and their productive lives at the time of their death. He also
noted the close relationship that he and his sister had with their
parents. He described the devastating impact of finding his
parents murdered in their living room. For example, he found
his parents at 4:00 p.m. and as a result would think of them
each day at that time and would awake at 4:00 each morning.
He felt his parents "were not killed, but were butchered like
animals."53 He was "fearful for the first time in his life," and
his family worried about his health.54
The daughter related the numbness she felt on learning
that her parents were murdered. She and her husband could
not eat dinner for three days after the news, and both cried for
four months. She stated that she was withdrawn and mistrust-
ful and that even the sight of a kitchen knife brought back pain-
ful memories. She felt she could never forgive her parents'
murderers and that they were beyond rehabilitation.55
The granddaughter pointed out that the murder turned
her sister's wedding (a few days later) into a gloomy occasion.
She received psychological counseling for several months, but
stopped because she thought she was beyond help.56
The interviewer summed up the interview by observing
that the murder
is such a shocking, painful, and devastating memory to
[the family] that it permeates every aspect of their daily
lives. It is doubtful that they will ever be able to fully
recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the
memory of the brutal manner in which their loved ones
were murdered and taken from them.5
50. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2531.
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986). For the text of the
provision, see supra note 16.
52. Id.
53. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2537.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2537-38.
56. Id. at 2538.
57. Id. at 2539.
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D. The Majority Opinion
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion 58 vacating
Booth's death sentence and holding that the "Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering vic-
tim impact evidence." 59 The Court began its analysis with a
review of prior Supreme Court decisions. In brief, the deci-
sions held that (1) the jury may not impose the death penalty in
an arbitrary and capricious manner, (2) the jury should make its
decision based on the "individual circumstances of the
crime,"" and (3) the jury must view only evidence that "has
some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and
moral guilt."'" Reduced to its simplest terms, the Court's rea-
soning is as follows: VISs are inflammatory and irrelevant to
the defendant's guilt. As such they inject an arbitrary and
capricious factor into the death sentence. An arbitrary and
capricious death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment,
barred by the eighth amendment. Thus, the Maryland statute
is unconstitutional.6 2
In the Court's opinion, the majority of the Bronsteins'
VISs described the "personal characteristics of the victims and
the emotional impact of the crimes on the family."'6 3 The
Court rejected the Maryland court's reasoning that the infor-
mation revealed the "full extent of the harm caused by Booth's
actions"64 and that by knowing the impact on the family the
jury was in a better position to measure the "gravity and aggra-
vating quality of the offense." 65
The Court determined relevancy by requiring that the evi-
dence be part of the circumstances of the crime. The Court
relied on Zant v. Stephens,6 6 which held that a capital jury must
make an "individualized determination of whether the defend-
ant in question should be executed, based on the 'character of
58. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stephens joined Powell's
opinion. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined justice
White's dissenting opinion. Scalia also wrote his own dissenting opinion, in
which Rehnquist, O'Connor, and White joined.
59. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2532.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2533.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 426 U.S. 862 (1983).
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the individual and the circumstances of the crime.' "67 The
Court's concern was that the defendant be treated with dignity.
By requiring lower courts to consider the circumstances of the
offense and the offender's background, the Court added insur-
ance that defendants would not be treated as members of a
"faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind
infliction of the penalty of death."68 The Court reasoned that
the information about the victim and the impact on his family
was beyond the circumstances of the offense and offender. The
Court thought that a defendant is often unaware of the victim's
family and may choose to kill the victim without intending to
harm the victim's family. The VIS "thus could divert the jury's
attention away from the defendant's background and record,
and the circumstances of the crime."
69
The Court's other objection to VISs was that they may
often contain inflammatory remarks. Powell quoted many of
the same remarks that the Maryland dissent found objectiona-
ble: the son's comment that his parents were "butchered like
animals" and that he did not think the defendants should be
able to get away with it; the daughter's remarks that she could
never forgive her parents' murderers and that she did not think
they could be rehabilitated.70
E. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice White
Justice White first noted that a murderer injures not only
his victim, but also the community at large and especially the
victim's family. He then pointed to early Supreme Court deci-
sions which held that "determinations of appropriate sentenc-
ing considerations" were "peculiarly questions of legislative
policy."' 71 He claimed that the Maryland legislature's decision
to include VISs in the sentencing process should remain
untouched on a principle of deference.7 2
White then attacked the majority's statement that "only
evidence going to blameworthiness is relevant to the capital
sentencing decision. ' 73 White used the example of two reck-
67. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. at 2533 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 426
U.S. at 879).
68. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
69. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2534.
70. Id. at 2535-36.
71. Id. at 2539.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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less drivers, one who happens to kill a pedestrian and one who
does not. Most people, claimed White, would be inclined to
say that the one who killed someone deserves more punish-
ment than the other, even though each had the same interior
disposition. Likewise, White reasoned that a similar approach
may be used in capital cases."4 In addition, wrote White, evi-
dence in a VIS balances the "mitigating evidence which the
defendant is entitled to put in."75
White acknowledged the majority's hesitation to say a
defendant who kills a "sterling member of the community" is
more deserving of punishment than a defendant who kills
someone of "questionable character." 76  White, however,
would not hesitate to use such information, because he thought
it was a valid measure of the "particularized harm that an indi-
vidual's murder causes to the rest of society ... and in particu-
lar to his family." 77
As to the majority's concern that some families may be
more articulate than others in expressing their grief, White
responded that the same is true for other witnesses and prose-
cutors, "but there is no requirement in capital cases that the
evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest common
denominator."7 Finally, White reasoned that although a par-
ticular VIS may be inflammatory, they are not inherently so.
Thus, the Court was wrong to find VISs unconstitutional per se
on those grounds.
Justice Scalia
Like White, Justice Scalia thought that "the amount of
harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his 'personal
responsibility.' "" Scalia used the example of one bank robber
who shoots a guard and another who intends to, but cannot
because the gun misfires. Scalia pointed out that although the
moral guilt in both situations is the same, the one who shoots
may receive the death penalty, whereas the other may not.
Scalia went further than White in his attack on the major-
ity's principle that punishment should be proportionate to the
defendant's blameworthiness. Scalia cited a recent Supreme
Court decision in which two brothers helped their father
74. Id. at 2539-40.
75. Id. at 2540.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2540-4 1.
79. Id.
1989]
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escape from prison.80 In the process, the father murdered a
married couple and their two children. The brothers received
the death penalty. Scalia noted that if their father had not
killed the family, the brothers would have lived. "The differ-
ence between life and death for these two defendants was thus
a matter 'wholly unrelated to the[ir] blameworthiness.' . . . But
it was related to their personal responsibility, i.e., to the degree
of harm that they had caused."'" Scalia ended his opinion by
echoing White's concern for judicial deference and a balance
against the defendant's claims of mitigating factors.8 2
In sum, the dissents presented five arguments against the
majority's holding. First, although some witnesses for the vic-
tim may be more articulate than others, the same argument
applies to prosecutors and their witnesses. The law is not
required to make the defendant's case easy. Second, punish-
ment should be in proportion not only to the defendant's guilt,
but also to the harm he causes. Third, VISs balance the miti-
gating evidence offered by the defendant. Fourth, VISs are not
inherently inflammatory. Fifth, courts should defer to a legisla-
ture's determination of what is relevant to a jury's
consideration.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Relevance
Few would dispute that the jury should not consider irrele-
vant evidence. The question is whether a VIS is always irrele-
vant. Because VISs are relevant in certain cases, Justice Powell
erred in precluding a jury from ever considering evidence in a
VIS. In this regard, Powell's first argument against the rele-
vance of VISs is that they contain information outside of the
circumstances of the offense and the offender. For instance,
Powell reasoned that a particular defendant might not know his
victim's family or status in the community. Nevertheless, a
defendant may in fact know his victim's family and status and
even choose to kill him with those factors in mind. For exam-
ple, a street gang might kill an opposing gang member as a way
to "get even" with the opposing gang. In those cases, Powell
would have no reason, based on the defendant's knowledge, to
exclude the information in a VIS. 83
80. Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
81. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2542.
82. Id.
83. In fact, Booth did know his victims, which at least raises the question
as to whether he also knew the victims' family members.
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Further, prior interpretations of "circumstances of the
offense and offender" would allow a legislature to include the
information of a VIS as an aggravating factor. As stated earlier,
the Court relied on Zant v. Stephens for the proposition that the
sentencer must consider the individual circumstances of the
offense and the offender.8 4 Zant v. Stephens was restating what a
line of Supreme Court decisions had held up to that time.85
Each of those decisions used "circumstances" to refer to the
aggravating or mitigating factors surrounding the murder.86
The use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
traceable to Furman v. Georgia.87 In Furman, the Supreme Court
struck down a number of state death penalty statutes (as uncon-
stitutional), because they lacked guidelines for the exercise of
the sentencer's discretion. 8 Georgia's was among those
declared unconstitutional. Later the Supreme Court scruti-
nized Georgia's revised death penalty statute in Gregg v. Geor-
gia.89 A Georgia jury had found the defendant Gregg guilty of
armed robbery and murder, and it sentenced him to death
using a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 90 On
review, the Supreme Court first found that capital punishment
was not inherently cruel and unusual. It then decided that the
Georgia statute, by providing the jury with guidelines for exer-
cising discretion, was constitutional and satisfied the Furman
concerns that death not be imposed in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner. 9'
The Court noted the fact that Georgia's aggravating and
mitigating circumstances focused the jury's attention on the
circumstances of the crime and the criminal .... Was [the
murder] committed in the course of another capital fel-
ony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed
upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed
84. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
85. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 601-05 (1978); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,
636-37 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 155, 190 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-04 (1976).
86. See cases cited supra note 85.
87. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
88. Id.
89. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
90. Id. at 161. The Georgia court informed the jury that it must find at
least one aggravating circumstance before it could punish the defendant with
death. For Georgia's then existing list of the aggravating circumstances, see
id. at 165 n.9.
91. Id. at 188, 199.
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in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endan-
gered the lives of many persons?
9 2
The information in answer to these last two categories
would include the information in a VIS. If the victim's status in
the community as a police officer is relevant, so should the vic-
tim's status in the community as a family member be relevant.
The family is the basic building block of society and is as essen-
tial to the community's survival as a police officer. An attack on
an officer is worse than an attack on a layman because it is an
attack on society. Similarly, an attack on a family member
injures his family, and thus is an attack on a vital component of
society.9 3 In addition, the heinousness of the murder surely
increases if, other factors being equal, the murderer intends
both to kill his victim and in the process to injure the victim's
family. Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court presently
allows the jury to consider a capital defendant's future danger-
ousness 94 (and thus, his potential to harm) should, a fortiori,
permit some consideration of his actual harm as well.
Powell's concern about the relative articulateness of family
members is also overbroad. As Justice White answered, "there
is no requirement in capital cases that the evidence and argu-
ment be reduced to the lowest common denominator."9 5 Fur-
ther, Powell's perceived inequity is premised on more certainty
than human capacity allows. "[I]t is evidently equally foolish to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to
demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs." '' 6 Sentencing
pertains to human actions, which are contingent and variable.
Since contingent and variable matters by their very nature
admit of less certainty, sentencing too admits of less certainty
than other matters might. More or less talented witnesses and
prosecutors are part of the variableness of human actions, and
they give rise to a lack of mathematical certainty that is inherent
in the sentencing process.
B. Balance
An additional argument in favor of VISs relates to their
importance in balancing the wide scope of mitigating factors
92. Id. at 197.
93. This notion will be developed more fully in the Ethical Analysis infra.
94. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).
95. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2540-41.
96. ARISTOTLE, ,Vichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
936 (R. McKeon ed. 1941).
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that a jury may consider at the request of the defendant.97 In
Lockett v. Ohio,9" the Supreme Court generally defined the
scope of mitigating factors a jury might consider. The Court
stated that the jury may consider "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."99 More concretely, this information may include evi-
dence of the defendant's youthful age, "of a turbulent family
history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional
disturbance."' 0 0 Georgia's Supreme Court "allowed relatives
of the defendant to testify concerning their love for the defend-
ant and their wish not to see the defendant executed."''
Most of this mitigating evidence cannot be said to be rele-
vant to the particular features of the crime. Instead, the evi-
dence is designed to place the crime in the often troubled
context of a defendant's life. The implicit premise of such con-
textual material is that society may bear a portion of the blame
for the defendant's aberrant behavior triggered by a disadvan-
taged background. Perhaps so. Nevertheless, if the relatives of
a murderer are able to tell the jury how much they would
mourn his loss as a matter of context-setting, should not the
innocent party's family be able to list the financial and emo-
tional loss they have already suffered?
C. Deference
The final difficulty for Powell is the dissent's claim of judi-
cial deference to the Maryland legislature's decision to include
VISs in the sentencing process. The Supreme Court has been
more concerned over a state's procedures for sentencing a per-
97. The victim, no less than the defendant, comes to court seeking
justice. When the court hears, as it may, from the defendant, his
lawyer, his family and friends, his minister, and others, simple
fairness dictates that the person who has borne the brunt of the
defendant's crime be allowed to speak.
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 77 (December
1982).
98. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
99. Id. at 604. In a note, the Court made clear that the evidence must be
relevant, that is, have some "bearing on the defendant's character, prior
record, or the circumstances of his offense." Id. at 604 n. 12.
100. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). Some death penalty
statutes restrict the number of aggravating factors ajury may consider, but do
not similarly limit the list of mitigating factors. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(e)-(f) (1983).
101. Note, State v. Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital Cases
on Grounds of Relevancy, 63 N.C.L. REV. 1122, 1132 (1985).
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son to death than it has over the substantive factors a state
uses. As White stated: "determinations of appropriate sen-
tencing considerations are 'peculiarly questions of legislative
policy.' "102
Simply because a legislature specified what factors the jury
will consider does not mean that its decision is unreviewable.
The Supreme Court has outlawed overly vague standards, con-
siderations outside the "characteristics of the offender and his
crime,"' 1 3 limited lists of mitigation factors, and presentence
reports "containing information that the defendant has had no
opportunity to explain or deny."' 4 Still, the principle of def-
erence creates a strong presumption in favor of the Maryland
legislature's decision.
III. ETHICAL ANALYSIS
Assuming the morality of the death penalty,10 5 an issue not
addressed in this case note, this section argues on a normative
102. Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. at 2539.
103. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
104. Id.
105. This does not mean the use of capital punishment is without
justification. Saint Thomas Aquinas argues for capital punishment based on
the analogy between the body and the body politic. Just as a cancerous organ
is removed from a person's body to preserve the whole, so those who present
a serious threat to the body politic are removed in order to preserve society.
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. 64, A. 2.
Some argue that while the state has the right to use capital punishment,
present circumstances call for its abolition. A number of American Bishops
took this stance in 1980 and, more recently, so did Ohio's Bishops in a
statement they released in March 1987. Ohio Bishops, A Reassessment of the
Death Penalty, 16 ORIGINS 726 (1987).
Arguing from a "consistent ethic of life, an ethic that gives witness to the
sacredness and values of every human life from conception until natural
death," the Bishops reasoned that "more destruction of human life through
capital punishment would not enhance people's respect for the sacredness of
the life of every person." Id. at 726-27. Society already witnesses enough
disrespect for life "expressed in abortion and euthanasia, in political
terrorism and assassinations, in the murderous policies of some political
regimes, in the threat of nuclear war and even in violent crime itself." Id. at
727.
The Bishops' phrasing is troublesome. Capital punishment is not simply
-more destruction of human life." Rather, it is the destruction of human life
that is guilty of a grievous crime. Thus capital punishment does not belong
in the same category as abortion, euthanasia, political terrorism, etc., which
involve the taking of innocent life.
While taking innocent life contributes to a general disrespect for life,
taking guilty life could have the opposite effect. Instead of cheapening life,
the death penalty shows society's high regard for life, so much so that those
who take man's greatest natural good must pay with their own.
If the state does have the right to use capital punishment, as the Bishops
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basis that a capital sentencing jury should consider VISs when
the defendant knows the victim's status in the community or
when that information is criminally foreseeable. The reasons
are that (1) the injury to a person connected with others is
more grievous than injury to a person who is not connected, (2)
the injury to a virtuous person is worse than injury to a vicious
one, (3) the blame for such injury may attach to the defendant,
and (4) the VIS satisfies the requirements of a just law.
A. Injury to a Person Connected with Others is Greater
All things being equal, an injury to persons connected with
others" 6 is an injury to a greater number of people. 10 7 This
premise finds support in common experience. A normal indi-
vidual, for instance, will take offense at an insult directed
toward his mother or father. Similarly, a police officer's con-
nection with others in the community may explain why murder-
ing such an officer is often an aggravating factor in death
penalty statutes. The person's connection with others creates a
form of unity, such that an injury to him is an injury to those he
is connected with, just as an injury to the hand is an injury to
the whole man.'0 8 The same reasoning applies to the family of
a murder victim. Not only is the family a unit itself that suffers
from the loss of its member, but in addition the family is con-
nected with society as an essential part to the whole. Thus, the
attack on a member of a family is truly an attack on the
community.
B. Injury to a Virtuous Person is Greater
An injury to a virtuous man is greater than an injury to a
vicious man for several reasons. First, in theological terms, the
Christian charity one person owes another springs from the
goodness in that other. Thus the virtuous man, who by defini-
tion possesses greater goodness than the vicious man, is more
worthy of charity. To kill the virtuous man, then, is a greater
sin against charity. Second, the virtuous man is less deserving
of injury, and thus to kill him is a greater offense against jus-
tice. Third, the virtuous man is connected with society, and
more than anyone else he preserves and promotes the common
of Ohio admit in their. statement, then perhaps a person's time is better spent
fighting those circumstances that actually do foster a disrespect for life.
106. For example, family, neighbors, co-workers, et cetera.
107. That is, to those connected with him. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra
note 105, 11-I, Q. 65, A. 4.
108. Id.
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good. His murder is therefore worse to the extent that it
demoralizes the community and deprives it of a greater
good. 109
C. Blame May Attach to the Defendant
In common speech, to blame someone for an action means
to impute that action to the person. A person may impute an
action to an individual only if it was voluntary."' The nature
of a voluntary act is better understood when compared to an
involuntary act. An involuntary act is done under compulsion
and (or) by reason of ignorance of the particular circumstances
of the act."'
A man may be ignorant... of who he is, what he is doing,
what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what
(e.g. what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what
end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to one's
safety), and how he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or
violently).' 12
A voluntary act is the opposite, an act in which the moving
principle is in the agent himself and which is done with a
knowledge of the particular circumstances." 3 Hence, if the
murderer was not under compulsion and was aware of the par-
ticular circumstances (to illustrate, if he knew of his victim's vir-
tue and connection with others), the injury to the family and
society is done voluntarily.
Even a defendant who claims ignorance of the fact that his
victim was the father of five children or the mayor of the city is
not automatically excused without a further finding of fact,
namely whether that information was criminally foreseeable.
Ignorance may be antecedent or consequent to the defendant's
will. Antecedent ignorance is ignorance (1) that is not willed
by the agent, (2) that causes him to do something he would not
have done, and (3) that concerns a fact the agent (defendant)
was not bound to know. For example, an agent may take
proper precautions while handling a gun, but be unaware of a
hidden defect that causes the gun to fire and injure someone.
Such ignorance causes involuntariness and, therefore, excuses
the agent." 4 Consequent or voluntary ignorance is ignorance
109. Id., II-II, Q. 64, A. 6.
110. Id., I-II, Q 21, A. 3.
111. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at 964-67.
112. Id. at 966.
113. Id. at 967.
114. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 105, I-I, Q. 6, A. 8.
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willed by the agent." 5 This kind of ignorance lessens the vol-
untariness of the action, but should not excuse if the jury deter-
mines that the fact in question was criminally foreseeable. To
do otherwise places a premium on ignorance.
D. VISs Satisfy the Requirements ofJustice
Law is an ordination of reason, promulgated by him who
has care of the community, for the sake of the common
good." 16 Laws are just
both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the
common good,-and from their author, that is to say,
when the law that is made does not exceed the power of
the lawgiver,-and from their form, when, to wit, bur-
dens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of
proportion and with a view to the common good.' 17
As discussed below, VISs satisfy all of these requirements.
1. VISs are not Outside the Lawmaker's Power to Use
To be just, a law must not exceed the power of the
lawmaker. For example, if a court decided a case over which it
had no jurisdiction, such a ruling would be unjust because it
would be outside its power. VISs are not only within the power
of the sentencer, but in fact assist it in reaching its decision.
A jury exceeds its power if it punishes an individual for
something outside the scope of his blameworthiness. To act
within its power and fashion a punishment that fits the crime,
the sentencer must know the relevant facts that increase or
decrease the defendant's blameworthiness. Blame for the
injury recorded in a VIS attaches to a defendant either when he
had actual knowledge of the circumstances, or when that infor-
mation was criminally foreseeable. Consequently, if ajury uses
a VIS under those circumstances, it does not look beyond the
defendant's blameworthiness and so does not exceed its power.
Further, the "purpose of the jury trial . . . is to prevent
oppression by the Government." ' 8 Governmental oppression
may take a number of forms, including an arbitrary and capri-
cious sentence. To avoid such a result, "accurate sentencing,
information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury
115. Id.
116. Id., I-Il, Q. 90, A. 1-4.
117. Id., I-Il, Q 96, A.4.
118. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
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of people who may never before have made a sentencing deci-
sion."' 19 VISs reveal the aggravating quality of the offense and
thereby help the juror isolate out the defendant who is worthy
of the death penalty. In this way, VISs help minimize the risk
of an arbitrary and capricious sentence. Oppression also exists
when the government silences one side of the debate, as Justice
Scalia and Justice White suggested with reference to the
Court's decision in Booth. As it now stands, only the death of a
police officer or certain other government officials constitutes
an aggravating circumstance. Yet, society may also suffer.
Equally serious losses may result when those connected with
others in a family or the community are killed. Wealth, posi-
tion, and law enforcement authority are hardly exhaustive
determinants of human worth. In the absence of VISs, the vic-
tim's family and community are unable to voice the extent of
that injury. VISs would remove this form of oppression as well.
2. VISs Advance the Common Good
To be just, a law must not only be within the power of the
lawmaker, but must also be ordered to the common good. To
illustrate, if a state law required that all taxes be set aside for
the governor's personal use, that law would be unjust because
it is ordered to the private good of an individual rather than the
common good of society.
The common good includes the "collection of public com-
modities and services (roads, ports, and schools) which the
organization of common life presupposes, the sound fiscal con-
dition of the state and military power, [and] the body of just
laws, good customs and wise institutions." 120 The jury is one
of these wise institutions. "Providing an accused with the right
to be tried by ajury of one of his peers [gives] him an inestima-
ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. '121
Besides preventing government oppression, juries add a "com-
mon sense judgment"122 to the sentencing process. "Our civi-
lization has decided, and very justly decided that determining
the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be
trusted to trained men."' 12 ' By assisting the jury-an institu-
119. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 191 (1976).
120. J. MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 52 (1966).
121. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
122. Williams, 399 U.S. at 101.
123. Chesterton, Foreword to L. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS,
PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY at v (1973).
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tion which itself advances the common good-VISs become a
part of that effort.
The common good also includes the virtue of the individu-
als that compose a society.124 Whether or not the sentencing
authority is a jury, VISs, if properly used, provide a broader
view of the case. As a result, the sentencer can better appreci-
ate the nature of the crime. Although peculiar to the modern
ear, VISs are ordered to the virtue of the potential murderer.
This is so because a VIS conveys the message that a convicted
murderer will be held accountable for the impact of his act on
the victim's family and community. Knowledge that this
accounting will be undertaken may thus deter and, in so doing,
impart virtue. Finally, VISs are a way for the victim's family,
which has had its integrity severely breached, to be re-united
with and assured by the fairness of civil society. Importantly,
this occurs through their own civic participation in the criminal
process.
3. VISs Lay Burdens Proportionately
Ajust law must lay burdens proportionately on the citizens
of a society. In the context of punishment, this means that a
sentencer should punish a defendant in proportion to his
guilt.12 5 The very purpose of a VIS is to help insure that the
sentencer recommends death only in those cases that deserve
it. The death penalty is appropriate where the defendant either
knew of his victim's importance to the community or where that
information was criminally foreseeable. Thus the defendant
does not *pay for more than he bargained for. And because the
use of VISs is within the sentencer's power, the sentencer like-
wise is not overburdened.
CONCLUSION
The Booth decision is a blow to victim's rights advocates.
State courts and legislatures will probably not challenge the
Supreme Court. In fact, the Maryland Supreme Court has
already conformed to the Supreme Court's wishes; it no longer
includes VISs in the capital sentencer's considerations. 126 As a
result, judges and juries will continue to sentence with
"impaired vision." 127
124. "Justice and moral righteousness are . ..essential to the common
good." J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE NATURAL LAW 9 (1949).
125. That is, guilt as measured by human law.
126. Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 72 n.14, 527 A.2d 3, 22 n.14 (1987).
127. Lodowski v. State, 490 A.2d 1228, 1255 (1985).
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The majority in Booth is one extreme. It excludes VISs
entirely from the capital sentencer's decision, even when the
defendant knew his victim's connection with others in the com-
munity or when that information was criminally foreseeable.
The dissenters are the other extreme. They would allow the
jury to consider a VIS, even when the defendant had no knowl-
edge of his victim's connections with others.
The middle position is most defensible. The sentencer
should consider VISs, but only when the defendant knew of his
victim's character and (or) connection with others in the com-
munity or when that information was criminally foreseeable.
Only then does blame attach to the defendant, and only then
does the VIS become relevant to measuring the full extent of
the harm the defendant caused.12 8
128. As this student comment went to press, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in South Carolina v. Gathers, 57 U.S.L.W.
4629 (U.S., June 13, 1989). In Gathers, a narrowly divided Court held that
prosecutorial comment on the character of a homicide victim was, in the
circumstances of that case, a violation of the principle established in Booth.
From Justice White's brief concurring opinion and from the dissenting
opinions ofJustices O'Connor and Scalia, it is reasonable to infer that there
are several votes on the Court in favor of either reversing Booth or limiting its
scope. This comment has argued that there are good normative grounds for
limiting Booth to the middle position described above.
